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ABSTRACT 
The consequences of using such complex tools as Logic and 
Mathematics, which are so ingrained in our own nature as thinking 
living organisms, to explain precisely that Nature in which we 
ourselves are imbedded, are disucssed from a new perspective. The 
interplay between the individual (subjective) world and the social 
(objective) world emerges with clarity under this light. 
Paradoxes, a nightmare for Logicians and Mathematicians, are 
returned to their cradle, the observer, where no hunt is set up to 
1. solve" them. Though I am not alone in this endeavour to consider 
paradoxes from a different perspective, new insights into the 
nature of the living organization and the working of the nervous 
system allow today the opportunity to strengthen this revolu- 
tionary viewpoint. 
Several experiments performed on a multicomputer realization 
of organizationally closed (paradoxical) unities, suggest a ner- 
vous system where processes and descriptions are more fundamental 
concepts than time and space. 
While the consequences of this new approach remain still to be 
explored, a sensitive reader will already enjoy them. 
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FOREWORD 
The perspective presented here, which the reader can accept or 
reject, points to creativity as a result of exploration which con- 
sists of an endless affirming and negating, thereby also changing, 
the present circumstances. 
Through a contrapuntal study of the individual being and the 
social being and their corresponding knowledges, I propose to 
escape a situation -- already among us human beings -- which 
endangers creativity conceived as above. It is my contention that 
without the perspective presented here, every attempt to stress 
the social or cooperative drives of human beings will end as a 
restricted and selective cooperation through association. This 
latter alternative has already contributed to a deleterious trend 
that will render more and more individuals to a more or less 
agonizing "burning at the stakes" at the hands of those entrusted 
to "defend and protect" the accepted (by some) rules of the game. 
Those defenders of human rights and the social inclinations of all 
human beings are increasingly shielded inside developed communi- 
ties, charitable organizations and what not from the atrocities 
committed or provoked by this same "social being". 
Of course human beings are social, but if we forget that they 
are also individual beings or if we do not understand what this 
entails, we will find ourselves striving for an anthill and not 
for a community of human beings. We must realize that human 
beings can relinquish their autonomy when they become part of a 
group of individuals and pursue the goals of the group, even if 
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these goals go against their own goals or those of their fellow 
human beings, especially if they are not members of the group. 
Therefore, it is an observer's perspective that I present in 
what follows and my aim is to stimulate in my reader again an 
observer's perspective. Although I cannot escape the use of a 
social language to do this, I hope, perhaps even more than an 
artist, that a sensitive observer will be able to reconstruct my 
image, in its own terms. 
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INTRODUCTION 
It has been the aim of many people to know (and understand) 
the world that they perceive through sense organs. However, as 
long as there is more than one individual, this endeavour has been 
two-faced, individual and social (as B. Russell suggests). This 
double nature of knowledge has been the source of a continuous 
struggle between these two forms of knowledge. Social knowledge 
has taken the robes of science, which aims at a totally impersonal 
knowledge, scientific knowledge; and of language, which is the 
only means of "communicating" scientific knowledge. Language is 
essential for social knowledge. It is not essential for indivi- 
dual knowledge since this one cannot be expressed verbally and 
hence cannot be "communicated. " A gifted artist can only hope 
that a sensitive recipient of his (her) art recreates his (her) 
own experiences. And to try this, the artist uses an artistic 
language like prose, poetry, music, painting, sculpture, .. - 
etc. and the peculiarity of these languages is that they are not 
meant to "communicate" something as scientific languages do, but 
only to stimulate in the recipient something different from what 
the language itself is. Not only if an artist tries to express 
herself (himself) in scientific language, but also if the recip- 
ient of her (his) message takes her (him) literally, that is, 
does not go beyond the artistic language itself, her (his) 
experiences will be lost in a barren land. 
In scientific language it is only the truth or falsehood of 
the statements that really matters, the diverse meanings that 
these same statements have for different individuals are usually 
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considered irrelevant, with the result that individual and social 
knowledges are often unwisely confused. 
We quote B. Russell: * "There are two ways of getting 
to know what a word means: one is by a definition in 
terms of other words, which is called 'verbal' definition; 
the other is by frequently hearing the word when the 
object which it denotes is present, which is called 
'ostensive' definition. It is obvious that ostensive 
definition is alone possible in the beginning, since ver- 
bal definition presupposes a knowledge of the words used 
in the 'definiens'. You can learn by a verbal definition 
that a pentagon is a plane figure with five sides, but a 
child does not learn in this way the meaning of everyday 
words such as 'rain', 'sun', 'dinner' or 'bed'. These 
are taught by using the appropriate word emphatically 
while the child is noticing the object concerned. 
Consequently, the meaning that the child comes to attach 
to the word is a product of his personal experience, and 
varies according to his circumstances and his sensorium. 
A child who frequently experiences a mild drizzle will 
attach a different idea to the word 'rain' from that 
formed by a child who has only experienced tropical 
torrents. A short-sighted and a long-sighted child will 
connect different images with the word 'bed'. 
It is true that education tries to depersonalize 
language, and with a certain measure of success. 'Rain' 
* Russel, Ref. 37, p. 4. 
is no longer the familiar phenomenon, but 'drops of water 
falling from clouds toward the earth', and 'water' is no 
longer what makes you wet, but H20. As for hydrogen and 
oxygen, they have verbal definitions which have to be 
learned by heart; whether you understand them does not 
matter. And so, as your instruction proceeds, the world 
of words becomes more and more separated from the world 
of the senses; you acquire the art of using words 
correctly, as you might acquire the art of playing the 
fiddle; in the end you become such a virtuoso in the 
manipulation of phrases that you need hardly ever 
remember that words have meanings. You have become 
completely a public character, and even your inmost 
thoughts are suitable for the encyclopedia. But you 
can no longer hope to be a poet, and if you try to be a 
lover you will find your depersonalized language not very 
successful in generating the desired emotions. You have 
sacrificed expression to communication, and what you can 
communicate turns out to be abstract and dry. 
It is an important fact that the nearer we come to 
the complete abstractness of logic, the less is the una- 
voidable difference between different people in the 
meaning attached to a word. I see no reason why there 
should be any difference at all between two suitably edu- 
cated persons in the idea conveyed to them by the word 
13841'. The words 'or' and 'not' are capable of having 
exactly the same meaning for two different logicians. 
Pure mathematics, throughout, works with concepts which 
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are capable of being completely public and impersonal. 
The reason is that they derive nothing from the senses, 
and that the senses are the source of privacy. The body 
is a sensitive recording instrument, constantly trans- 
mitting messages from the outside world; the messages 
reaching one body are never quite the same as those 
reaching another, though practical and social exigencies 
have taught us ways of disregarding the differences be- 
tween the percepts of neighboring persons. In construct- 
ing physics we have emphasized the spatio-temporal aspect 
of our perceptions, which is the aspect that is most 
abstract and most nearly akin to logic and mathematics. 
This we have done in the pursuit of publicity, in order 
to communicate what is communicable and to cover up the 
rest in a dark mantle of oblivion. " 
As you can see, our conventional rearing and education are 
rather crippling with respect to individual knowledge. Not only 
does it inhibit our faculty to recreate beyond language and per- 
ception, but it definitely destroys our hope to become artists or 
even creative scientists. The emphasis is in the construction of 
a common (scientific) language, devoid of the contradictions and 
differences that individual knowledge would certainly add to it. 
The common (scientific) language has obvious advantages, but when 
these advantages become such that we are unaware of its disadvan- 
tages, we should stop and wonder. But before we do this let us 
consider what Piaget, our brilliant contemporary biologist and 
psychologist, has to say about this and how he could stimulate in 
us, if we still have the artist alive inside us, an even more 
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serious concern about the extent to which the (scientific) 
language is "covering up the rest in a dark mantle of oblivion". 
Piaget is a (passionate) advocate of considering Mathematics 
in total harmony with the world. How is it possible, one wonders, 
that a man who dedicates his life's effort to the understanding of 
man as a living creature, can still sustain with strong conviction 
that the "entire world of reality can be expressed in mathematical 
terms, and a fortiori, in logical terms? " when he himself concedes 
the following while considering the possible hereditary nature of 
logical structures: * 
"As a result, we are confronted with a sort of evolution 
which is to a great extent endogenous but is not pro- 
grammed as to the details of its content; it is remi- 
niscent of epigenesis (as we saw in section 2) but from a 
purely functional point of view that allows of no out- 
right assimilation of logic into some hereditary mechanism, 
while compelling us to look for its origins in those 
functions which appertain to the living organization. " 
But let us quote Jean Piaget when he answers the following 
question that he asks himself: 
** 
"How, in fact, are we to explain the harmony that exists 
between mathematics and the real world? " First, we must 
remember that this harmony is a real fact -- and a sur- 
prising one at that. It must be emphasized at once that 
* Piaget, 1971, p. 307. 
** Piaget, 1971, p. 339. 
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the entire world of reality can be expressed in mathe- 
matical terms and, a fortiori, in logical terms. There 
is no known physical phenomenon which has defied 
expression in mathematical form, and attemps that have 
been made to prove the contrary, such as Hegel's 
"Naturphilosophie", have come to nothing. Biology still 
finds itself confronted by a succession of unknown forms, 
and some have concluded from this that there is a limit 
to what can be expressed in mathematical terms. However, 
before any decision is reached, we shall have to examine 
by what means such mysteries might be cleared up. Can an 
explanation be found that is intelligible although not 
mathematical? Philosophers think so, although no one has 
ever been able to give any epistemological proof that 
there is a kind of knowledge which can properly be called 
philosophical as distinct from scientific. * Or can there 
be an explanation which is intelligible just because it 
is logico-mathematical? Since setting oneself up as a 
prophet is a tricky business, I shall only say that, up 
to now, any rational, biological explanation of phenomena 
such as heredity and regulations has proved to be con- 
sistent with logico-mathematical models, and that, inso- 
far as the arguments of the vitalists and finalists have 
any validity, this has been to the extent of their con- 
formity to cybernetic models of which they themselves 
knew nothing and whose discovery owes nothing to them. 
* See J. Piaget, 1968. 
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This only goes to show that the concept of finality as 
irreducible to mathematization was, in fact, false. In 
the realm of psychology we are very far from being able 
to express things in any satisfactory mathematical form; 
yet very few psychologists are attracted to vitalism on 
account of the many ordinal processes and the way in 
which algebraic logic can be utilized. Generally 
speaking, mathematics today is taking a decidedly quali- 
tative trend, and its involvement with isomorphisms of 
all kinds has opened up such broad structuralist perspec- 
tives that there is apparently no field -- human, biolo- 
gical, or physical -- that cannot now be reduced to 
fairly elaborate mathematicization. " 
Perhaps it is the enormous complexity that Logic and Mathe- 
matics have achieved or still can attain that deludes many of us 
into forgetting what Wittgenstein wrote about them: * 
"6.1 The propositions of logic are tautologies. 
6.11 Therefore the propositions of logic say nothing. 
(They are the analytic propositions. ) 
6.111 All theories that make a proposition of logic appear 
to have content are false. 
000a*000 
6.2 Mathematics is a logical method. 
The propositions of mathematics are equations, and 
therefore pseudo-propositions. 
L. Wittgenstein: "Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus" (Routledge and 
Kegan Paul, London, 1974). 
II 
6.21 A prooosition of mathematics does not express a 
thought. 
0*. 00a0a 
6.22 The logic of the world, which is shown in tautolo- 
gies by the propositions of logic, is shown in 
equations by mathematics. " 
Consequently logic and mathematics are tautological in the 
sense that they are aggregates of linked propositions (logic) or 
equations (mathematics) in which the validity of the links between 
them is not doubted and the truth of the propositions or equations 
is not claimed, and hence they generate no new thoughts. 
Where is logic or mathematics, T ask myself, in such a basic 
and contradictory drive of every young human being or other living 
organisms at any age which compels them to abandon (change, 
contradict) the secure and comfortable environment that they have 
found or created for themselves through previous struggles and 
efforts, in order to explore the world around them, find or create 
a new environment, only to leave (change, contradict) it sooner or 
later. Quite the opposite: logic and mathematics, as tools for 
social knowledge, will precisely go against this contradictory 
drive. 
Without even suggesting a vitalist position it is my aim to 
advance an invitation to consider the viewpoint from which at 






As we know, logicians and mathematicians have maintained an 
epic struggle against paradoxes and many have claimed to have 
19 solved" them, always striving for a paradox-free discipline. 
Wittgenstein, however, chose not to hunt for paradoxes, but rather 
dealt with the matter at the outset: he showed that no proposi- 
tion in logic can make a statement about itself. * Since a paradox 
makes a statement about itself, he liberated logic of all para- 
doxes in one elegant stroke. Wittgenstein also claims that his 
paradox-free logic mirrors the world, ** from which one could 
conclude that he assumes the world to be also paradox-free. I do 
not think so, and I prefer to understand Wittgenstein as main- 
taining that his logic mirrors only part of the world, that part 
which is paradox-free. It seems that for other logicians and 
mathematicians, logic mirrors the world including those paradoxi- 
cal aspects of it, which are, according to them, only apparent and 
consequently can be and will be eventually "resolved" through 
logic and mathematics. This, however, might prove to be an 
endless struggle, as many logicians and mathematicians would 
agree, since new paradoxes are always unveiled. The goal anyway 
L. Wittgenstein: "Tractatus Logico-Philosphicus", 
Propositions 3.332,3.333. 
ibidem, Propositions 6.13,5.511. 
ibidem, Propositions 5.61,5.632,6.113,6.41; see also 5.143, 
6.3. 
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is a logic and mathematics free from paradoxes, and this will be 
attained, so they hope, sooner or later. 
Following Wittgenstein's approach we will assume that logic 
and mathematics are free from paradoxes at the outset, and as such 
they constitute a mirror-image of some part of the world. 
We will consider quite apart from logic and mathematics a set 
of paradoxes (or paradoxical propositions) that will allow us to 
mirror, so I sustain,, that part of the world which is indeed para- 
doxical. Obviously, together with Wittgenstein, we are not join- 
ing the hunt of paradoxes since from this perspective it appears 
clearly nonsensical. 
In other words, we will consider two aspects of the world, one 
paradox-free, the other paradoxical and their corresponding 
mirrors: the propositions of logic and mathematics and the para- 
doxical propositions. It should be clear then, that we are not 
advocating paradoxes instead of paradox-free logic, but rather the 
coexistence of paradoxes and paradox free logic. 
The world 
* 
"Everything said is said by an observer to another observer 
than can be the same observer" (Maturana and von Foerster, circa 
1973). 
* Please see: 
G. Spencer Brown: "Laws of Form" (Ref. 40). 
Gordon Pask: "An Approach to Cybernetics" (Ref. 24). 
Heinz von Foerster: "An Epistemology for Living Things" 
(Ref. 47). 
Ludwig Wittgenstein: "Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus" (Ref. 55). 
Bertrand Russell: "Introduction to Wittgenstein's Tractatus" 
(Ref. 55). 
H. Maturana and F. Varela: "Autopoiesis and Cognition" 
(Ref. 21). 
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In our social (logical) attempts to create (a description of) 
the world, a universe comes into being when a space is severed 
into two. A distinction is made and a state of affairs (object, 
event) is defined. 
Objl Obj2 Obj3 Obj4 
"Objects" creating "Events" 
and vice versa (von Foerster) 1976) 
A state of affairs is a configuration of objects and events. 
Events are temporal objects. 
The totality of existing state of affairs is the world. 
However, we (the subjects), are living organisms which are 
part of and observers of the world. 
Living organisms are unities (state of affairs) whose organi- 
zation is the autopoietic organization (see Chapter 2). As such, 
they are self-referential unities that define themselves in the 
space in which their components exist through a fundamental 
distinction: the specification of their own boundaries. This 
distinction determines the living unity and its niche (defined by 
the unity's own perspective) or the living unity and its environ- 
ment (defined by the perspective of an external observer). These 
two perspectives will always arise when an observer and a living 
organism (which could be the observer itself) interact. 
15 
Living organisms, with or without a nervous system, interact 
with their niche through interactions that are relevant to their 
living, and through these interactions they "know". In Maturana's 
words: * to living systems are cognitive systems, and living as a 
process is a process of cognition. " "The nervous system expands 
the cognitive domain of the living system by making possible 
interactions with 'pure relations', it does not create cognition. " 
A living organism becomes an observer when it can recursively 
interact with the representations of its interactions, thereby 
recursively generating representations of relations between repre- 
sentations. 
In Heinz von Foerster's words: 
"The environment of an observer is the representation 
of relations between 'objects' and 'events'. 'Objects' 
and 'events' are representations of relations. 
'Objects' and 'events' are the result of the computa- 
tion of an equivalence relation. 
Since the computation of equivalence relations is 
not unique, the results of these computations, namely, 
'objects' and 'events' are likewise not unique. 
This explains the possibility of an arbitrary number 
of different, but internally consistent (language deter- 
mined) taxonomies. 
* Maturana, 1980. 
von Foerster, 1976. 
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This explains the possibility of an arbitrary number 
of different, but internally consistent (culturally 
determined) realities. 
Since the computation of equivalence relations is 
performed on primitive experiences (representations of 
relations), an external environment is not a necessary 
prerequisite of the computation of a reality. " 
Moreover, when several observers interact in an "environment" 
they can only orient each other within their respective cognitive 
domains. 
Consequently, there are (at least) two perspectives from which 
the observer(s) can choose to construct its realities (descrip- 
tions of the world): 1) A perspective that does not assume an 
environment apart from the observer(s), i. e. the perspective of 
the observer(s) as individual (paradoxical) being(s); and 2) A 
perspective that assumes an environment as a separate entity from 
the observer(s), i. e. the perspective of the observer(s) as social 
(logical) being(s). 
From the first perspective, the observer constructs its reali- 
ties only through recursively generating representations of rela- 
tions between representations without any orientations from an 
environment apart from itself or other observers. We shall call 
these realities, paradoxical realities. From the second perspec- 
tive each observer constructs its realities through orientations 
from-its environment that may include other observers, thereby 
assuming the existence of an environment "out there" (to contain 
at least the observers). The construction of an observer- 
independent reality and a logical language appears then as a 
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natural consequence of this choice of perspective by the observer. 
We shall call these realities, logical realities. 
Even though, in principle, each observer can choose either 
perspective to construct its realities or even wander from one to 
the other at will giving emphasis to one or the other, the 
construction of a reality can be a rather involved process and the 
escape from a cherished reality is usually very painful. 
From a paradoxical (individual) perspective, we postulate one 
or more universes (or independent processors) and space and time 
may arise only later as a consequence of process interactions (see 
Chapter 4). This is quite different from the social (logical) 
perspective that postulates space and only then universes may come 
into being. Consequently, the pictures of the world derived from 
each perspective are profoundly diverse. 
We can say now that "everything said is said from a perspec- 
tive chosen by an observer to the same or another perspective cho- 
sen by the same or another observer". This may lead to many 
possible, often conflicting, realities. 
Logical language and paradoxical language * 
The choice of perspective determines the type of reality that 
the observer constructs and with it the type of language that the 
observer uses. Logical realities will be constructed together 
with a logical language and paradoxical realities, together with a 
paradoxical language. 
Strictly, there is no such thing as a paradoxical "language" in 
the usual sense of the word. "Language" is used here only as a 
point of departure towards a new concept that will become clearer 
later. 
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In the first case, the observer constructs a reality free from 
paradoxes that allows the development of social knowledge among a 
plurality of observers. In the second case the observer con- 
structs a reality in which only paradoxes are possible, social 
knowledge becomes impossible and only individual (paradoxical) 
knowledge can flourish. Obviously the same observer can take one 
stand or the other. 
Let us consider the characteristics of a logical language and 
those of a paradoxical language. 
The essential matter of a logical language is to assert or 
deny facts (i. e. the existence or non-existence of state of 
affairs) outside the subject, i. e. with respect to the observer 
as a social being. 
A logical language is, therefore, irrelevant for the subject 
(observer) as an individual, not social, being. 
The function of a logical language is to have meaning for the 
subject (observer) as a social being and it only fulfills this 
function in proportion as it approaches to an ideal language: a 
logically perfect language. And it is as such that it constitutes 
the basis for social knowledge (see Introduction). 
A logical proposition is a picture of the world, i. e. it 
depicts reality (a logical reality) by representing a possibility 
of existence or non-existence of state of affairs. 
A logical proposition agrees with reality or fails to agree, 
it is true or false, from the observer's viewpoint as a social 
being. 
In order to tell whether a logical proposition is true or 
false, the observer must compare it with reality. 
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Logical propositions, as pictures of reality, cannot be 
contradictory. Either an event occurs or it does not; an object 
is or is not, there is no middle way. 
Logical propositions cannot make statements about themselves, 
i. e. they cannot be self-referential. 
However, there are self-referential state of affairs in the 
world, i. e. configurations of objects and events that form closed 
loops. The representation of these self-referential state of 
affairs in logic is impossible, since they lead to self-referen- 
tial loops of propositions. 
Therefore, if we are to consider self-reference as part of the 
world that we want to represent in our language we must have a 
different domain, a paradoxical language, in which self-referen- 
tial loops of propositions are possible. These loops can contra- 
dict (change) themselves or not. If they do, they will be called 
paradoxical loops of propositions. Self-referential loops of 
propositions that do not contradict (change) themselves will not 
be considered here, because by affirming (confirming) themselves 
they imply a static a=a, thereby making the loop and the self- 
reference irrelevant, that is, they constitute a return to logic 
and to logical realities. 
The need for going beyond a logical language can already be 
seen in the limitations that Wittgenstein found when concerned 
with the conditions for a logically perfect language (Tractatus 
Logico-Philosophicus), which B. Russell expounds brilliantly in 
his Introduction to the Tractatus: 
* See examples in "Paradoxes" below. 
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"His (Wittgenstein's) attitude towards this (the 
mystical) grows naturally out of his doctrine in pure 
logic, according to which the logical proposition is a 
picture (true or false) of the fact, and has in common 
with the fact a certain structure. It is this common 
structure which makes it capable of being a picture of 
the fact, but the structure cannot itself be put into 
words, since it is a structure of words, as well as of 
the facts to which they refer. Everything, therefore, 
which is involved in the very idea of the expressiveness 
of language must remain incapable of being expressed in 
language, and is, therefore, inexpressible in a perfectly 
precise sense. This inexpressible contains, according to 
Mr. Wittgensein, the whole of logic and philosophy. " 
Logical propositions constitute a mirror-image of that part of 
the world that has logical form. 
Paradoxical loops of propositions constitute a mirror-image of 
that part of the world which has paradoxical form. Therefore, 
there is no such thing as a paradoxical proposition without change 
and self-reference. 
The essential matter of a paradoxical language is to explore 
the reality (a paradoxical reality) proper of the subject 
(observer) as an individual,, not social, being. 
The function of a paradoxical language is to create under- 
standing in the individual and it only fulfills this function in 
proportion as it approaches to an ideal language: a paradoxically 
perfect language. And it is as such that it constitutes the basis 
for individual knowledge (See Introduction). 
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(Neither a paradoxically perfect language nor a logically 
perfect language seem attainable, but their impossibility does 
not prevent them from showing a path). 
A paradoxical loop of propositions is a picture of the world. 
That is, it depicts reality (a paradoxical reality) by repre- 
senting a possibility of existence of a paradoxical state of 
affairs. 
Whether a paradoxical loop of propositions agrees with reality 
or fails to agree is immaterial from the observer's viewpoint as 
an individual being. 
Paradoxical loops of propositions, being self-referential, 
determine themselves what is the case. For example, since they 
c ange 
* themselves, they can be true and false, independent of a 
comparison with reality. 
In a paradoxical language (the. language of the individual 
being) there is no need for names to refer to state of affairs. 
The observer can "talk" to itself about state of affairs by per- 
ceiving them through the senses, by imagining them or by dreaming 
about them (e. g. the same state of affairs can be perceived and 
imagined, i. e. it can "exist" and "not exist" concurrently). 
Moreover, from the perspective of the observer as an individ- 
ual, whether the state of affairs are perceived, imagined or 
dreamed is immaterial; it is only when the observer becomes a 
social being (including being social with itself) that the dif- 
ference between its "inside world" and the "outside world" becomes 
k 
relevant, even crucial. 
e. g. contradict. Please forget the connotation of time that is 
usually implied with change. 
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What is relevant to logic is the relation between the set of 
words of a proposition considered as a fact on its own account, 
and the "objective" fact which makes the proposition true or false 
as well as the meaning that this relation conveys to the observer 
as a social being. 
From a logical viewpoint, when a person believes in a proposi- 
tion, the person, considered as a metaphysical subject, does not 
have to be assumed in order to explain what is happening. 
From a paradoxical viewpoint, nothing can be explained without 
assuming the subject since this subject is part of the paradoxical 
world (and hence cannot be metaphysical). 
What is relevant to a paradoxical language is the relation 
between a paradoxical loop of propositions and the paradoxical 
state of affairs that it may depict, independent of a comparison 
with the particular reality considered by the observer, as well as 
the understanding that this relation conveys to the observer as an 
individual being. 
Logical propositions can only say how logical state of affairs 
are., not what they are. 
Paradoxical loops of propositions can only say how paradoxical 
state of affairs are, not what they are. 
Subjects are paradoxical state of affairs. 
Logic and the observer 
The utterances made by an observer can be of many sorts: 
sayings,, statements, sentences, propositions, propositions of 
logic, propositions of mathematics, tautologies, contradictions, 
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self-referential loops of propositions, paradoxes, referential 
propositions, etc. etc. 
However, to assign a given utterance to one of these classes 
is not trivial and has caused many discussions among observers. 
Part of the problem arises in relation to the truth or false- 
hood attached to the given utterance. To decide whether the 
utterance is true or false an observer makes a comparison with 
I. reality" and, since it is the observer who chooses the "reality" 
to be considered, the decision (true, false or otherwise) is 
observer-dependent. 
Therefore, it is conceivable that some difficulties (e. g. 
contradictions) may arise among observers with conflicting reali- 
ties. Social (logical) knowledge has taught us that most of these 
difficulties can eventually be resolved through a revision of the 
conflicting realities and the construction of a new, more encom- 
passing, reality adopted by the participant observers. One of 
these adjustments occurred when it was realized that the dream of 
classical science, a purely "objective" description of the world 
in which there were no subjects, contained contradictions. To 
remove these contradictions, an observer (i. e. at least one 
subject) had to be accounted for: observations are not absolute 
but relative to an observer's point of view (Einstein); the 
observer's hope for prediction vanishes, the uncertainty of the 
observer is absolute (Heisenberg) (see von Foerster, 1976). 
However, the inclusion of the observer in what is observed 
(the world) creates all sorts of difficulties (e. g. paradoxes) if 
we insist in a logical reality, i. e. a logical description of a 
world that includes the observers. 
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In logicý propositions can be part of other propositions) 
thereby becoming 'primitive propositions' with respect to the 
latter. Their truth-values determine the truth or falsehood of 
the 'composite proposition'. 
Example 1: r is a 'composite proposition' (with respect to p 
and q), and p and q are 'primitive propositions' (with respect 
to 0. 
pqr 







The truth table defines the sign V (or) but says nothing about 
r. Only when the truth values of p and q are ascertained we can 
know the truth or falsehood of r. 
But, perhaps not in logic anymore, we can conceive proposi- 
tions that refer directly to the truth or falsehood of another 
proposition, thereby becoming 'primitive propositions' with 
respect to the latter. Again, their truth values determine the 
truth or falsehood of the referred proposition. The 'primitive 
propositions' can be seen now as the possible statements of dif- 
ferent observers with respect to the truth or falsehood of the 
referred proposition, after a comparison with the different 
.I 
realities" that each observer has chosen. 
Example 2: p and q are 'primitive propositions' (with respect 









F and T (contradiction) 
F 
T 
T and F (contradiction) 
Now the truth table says something about r. namely that for 
certain values of p and q, r is a contradiction. 
That is, if p and q are both true or both false, r is true and 
false which amounts to a contradiction. Since contradictions (and 
tautologies) are not pictures of reality, *r can picture reality 
only when p=F and q=T (r=F) or when p=T and q=F (r=T). Otherwise r 
is a contradiction and hence cannot determine a reality. 
Notice that in this contradiction true and false coexist 
("fighting" each other) without hope for a resolution of the 
conflict. In formal logic, a contradiction is defined as the con- 
junction of contradictory sentences e. g.: aAa, i. e. a and not 
(a) and it is always false. In fact, this is a basic law of 
sentential calculus (the most fundamental part of logic) called 
the Law of Contradiction (first enunciated by Aristotle) and is 
expressed as: 
aAa, i. e.: not (a and not (a)) 
However, as we pointed out above, our interest resides now in 
the conflict created between true and false by conflicting reali- 
ties constructed by different observers. 
* Wittgenstein op. cit.: Proposition 4.462 
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Example 3: an interesting case to consider is a paradox: 
r: "This proposition is false" 
p: -or is true" 
q: "r is false" 
Considering r alone, we find that: If r is true, then it is 
false. If r is false, then it is true. 
Therefore, r contradicts itself, independent of p and q and of 
a comparison with any reality. r is not a proposition of logic 
because it is self-referential, * so it cannot mirror a logical 
reality. However, being paradoxical, it can indeed mirror a para- 
doxical reality. Notice that r, being self -referential, blends 
true or false into one true and false, thereby rendering p and q 
non-sensical since the case is not true or false anymore, but 
true and false. Notice than in a contradiction without self- 
reference (see example 2 above) true and false do not blend but 
rather oppose (fight) each other. 
The paradoxical loop of proposition r can be expanded to a 
paradoxical loop of n propositions (n=l, 2.3) *as) 
rl: "proposition r2 is true" 
r2: "proposition r3 is true" 
I. rn: proposition rl is false" 
It is significant that recent studies in the philosophical 
foundations of mathematics and logic have concentrated their 
* It affects (changes) itself. 
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attention in propositions close to rl,, r2, ... rn and r above, but 
without getting too close and running into difficulties. 
Although self-reference has been banned from logic, in some 
cases it leads to interesting and fascinating mathematical 
theories (e. g. recursive functions, set theory) (see A. R. 
Anderson in R. L. Martin, 1970). 
Paradoxes 
We have already mentioned two characteristics of paradoxes, 
namely self-reference and change. * There is a third one, vicious 
circularity, to which Russell and Whitehead dedicate special 
attention in their "Principia Mathematica". ** Examples of para- 
doxes abund, but they are presented almost invariably as abstract 
examples of the so called logical paradoxes. This latter name 
comes obviously from logicians and mathematicians who want to deal 
with paradoxes inside their disciplines, and the insistence on 
abstraction has probably a similar explanation. As we already 
stated above, our intention is quite different: we assume the 
existence of a paradoxical world and a set of paradoxical loops of 
propositions that mirrors it. 
Two examples of the paradoxical world are the Moebius band and 
the electromagnetic buzzer: 
* e. g. contradiction. 
** Whitehead and Russell: "Principia Mathematica, " The Theory of 




a) You can form a ring with a strip of paper if you glue the 
ends together. However, if you give one end a half twist before 
gluing it to the other end, you will have a Moebius band. The 
paradoxical nature of this band can be grasped most clearly by 
performing the following experiment: starting anywhere on the 
band, an observer assumes side Q, marks the surface with aQ and 
the other side with an R. Moving along the band the observer con- 
tinues the markings and the assumption of being on side Q all the 
time. Suddenly the observer finds an R marking that changes the 
original assumption. The observer starts the whole process again 
assuming side R, only to find the Q markings on its path, again a 
change. Self-reference is evident from the fact that the observer 
returns to the same markings, and viscious circularity is clear 
from the circular shape of the path. It is indeed a paradoxical 
band, an excellent example of blending in a paradox: two sides 
blend into one. 
A paradoxical loop of propositions that mirrors the Moebius 
band is the following, which belongs to type 3 (see below); 
1. Statement 2 is true 
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Statement 3 is true 
0 
n. Statement 1 is false 
Notice that statement n corresponds to the twist, and all the 
others to no twist and that all the Moebius bands generated by any 
odd number of twists have their mirror-image in a similar para- 
doxical loop with the same number of statements like statement n. 
b) The circuit is such that when current flows through the 
coil of the elecromagnet E, the armature A is attracted to it, 
thereby interrupting the flow of current at contact C. If there 
is no current through the coil, the armature falls and makes con- 
tact at C. 
If the contact is made, then the contact is broken. If r, 
then not r. 
Consequently, the mirror-image of this paradox is of type I 
(see below), as the paradox: "This sentence is false", which 
negates itself - 
Notice that the buzzer circuit actually "works" 
* if you build 
one, but this happens because you, as an observer, assume a 
reality in which time is unfolded (see Chapter 3). 
Another example of a paradoxical loop follows: 
* It oscillates. 
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When the armature Af alls, it makes contact at C, turning the 
lamp L on. The light sensitive switch (LSS) closes, thereby 
allowing the tone generator (TG) to activate the speaker (S) The 
sound sensitive switch (SSS) closes energizing the electromagnet 
(E) . The electromagnet attracts the armature (A) that breaks the 
contact C. turning the lamp off. This causes the speaker to be 
silent and this, the electromagnet to release the armature that 
falls and makes contact at C, repeating the whole cycle again, and 
so on and on. Type 3 (see below). 
Nature is rich in paradoxical loops like ecological system- 
wholes, living organisms (autopoietic) and other organizationally 
closed unities (see Chapters 2 and 4), whose identity transcends 
the constant turnover (change) of their "components". It is only 
from a logical perspective that these unities seem to have "inputs" 
and "outputs" and to change into themselves. Their paradoxical 
nature will elude us as long as we persist in only a logical 
perspective of the world. 
There are three basic types of paradoxical loops: 
4F 
aýýb (odd number of i 9. ) 
a, b_, c ........ n are state of affairs or propositions. 
i---; Im-j 
ii-i 
means that i affirms j (i confirms 
means that i changes j (e. g.: i contradicts 
* Notice that in all the different types of loop there is always 
at least one change. See also "Logical language and paradoxical 
language" above. 
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Let us consider some examples: 
1) The paradox of Epimenides: 
r "Epimenides, the Cretan says: 'All Cretans are liars'; 
"Epimenides, the Cretan says II is a proposition (that mirrors the 
state of affairs Epimenides, the speaking Cretan of the world), 
say "a"; and what it says, "All Cretans are liars , is another 
proposition, say "b", that contradicts * itself by stating that 
all Cretans (including Epimenides) do not speak truth, i. e. "b" 
is not true. Hence, the paradox can be represented by: 
a ! P-b and belongs to type 1. 
2) Other versions of the Epimenides paradox give the fol- 
lowing results: 
i) r: "I am lying" or "I say: I am lying" 
a: 'I sayf 
b: 'I am lying' 
a____a--b type 1. 
ii) r: "This proposition is false" 
a: 'This proposition is false' 
a type I 
iii) Socrates: 'What Plato is about to say is false' 
Plato: 'Socrates has just spoken truly' 
a: 'Socrates' 
b: 'What Plato is about to say is false' 
c: 'Plato' 




Evidently, what Socrates and Plato utter does not refer to 
them but to what they utter. 
3) Russell's paradox of classes: 
"Let w be the class of all those classes which are not members 
of themselves. Then, whatever class x may be, 'x is a w' is 
equivalent to 'x is not an x'. Hence, giving to x the value w, 'w 
is a w' is equivalent to 'w is not a w'. " 
In other words: 
r: "If w is a w, then w is not a w" 
a: 1w is a w' 
a type 
4) The Moebius band: 
a: A piece of straight band 
b: Another piece of straight band 
C: Another piece of straight band 
. 
0 
n-1: Another piece of straight band 
n: A piece of twisted band 
a' type 
Notice that any odd number of twists generates a Moebius band. 
5) A photosensitive device turns a light on if it is dark and 
off if it is bright. If the light is on, it is bright and if it 
is off, it is dark. 
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In other words: 
a: If dark, then light on 
b: If light on, then bright 
C: If bright, then light off 
d: If light off, then dark 
Which amounts to: 
a: If light on, then light off 
b: If light offl then light on 
as the buzzer circuit. 
Therefore 
a or type I 
It is not difficult to build a circuit with more lamps and 
photosensitive devices arranged in such a way that they become 
paradoxical loops (2 or 3). And this corresponds clearly to 
different arrangements of inverter gates in the field of digital 
circuits. The case is that all feedback loops in artificial and 
natural systems may imply paradoxical loops which are usually 
disregarded after the introduction of time. Examples I and 2 
above suggests the possibility of propositional branches, but it 
is only when these branches close to form loops that self- 
reference appears and paradoxes could arise. 
The view from the paradoxical world 
Logicians and mathematicians have always considered logic and 
mathematics only from the inside of logic and mathematics. 
We have also enjoyed logical and mathematical dictum every- 
where as one of the most pervasive. The realm of paradoxes that 
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we are considering now, offers a new perspective that will provide 
a view from the outside into logic and mathematics and a novel 
approach elsewhere as well. To show this, we will use a paradoxi- 
cal approach to look at logical propositions. 
Let us assume that an observer decides to construct a reality 
that includes the observer. In order to construct this reality, 
the observer explores its environment through interactions of 
which the observer recursively generates representations of rela- 
tions between representations (see "The world"). It is inter- 
esting to notice here the paradoxical nature of a recursion: 
substituting a function for its own argument it refers to itself 
(i. e. it is self -referential); it replaces, hence it changes 
(itself); and it goes round and round, since the substitution can 
occur over and over. 
In this exploration of its environment, the observer will 
eventually interact with itself, thereby defining a self- 
referential loop. Therefore, if the observer is going to include 
itself in its reality, self-referential loops must also be 
included and consequently this reality cannot be a logical one, 
since in logic there is no room for a self-reference that affects 
(changes) the argument (see below). 
Let us inquire into the nature of this self-referential loop 
defined by the observer observing itself. 
An observer defines a priori a distinction between the 
observer itself and what is observed. An observer observing 
itself makes the observer observed and the observed observer, 
* See also "Logic and the observer" above. 
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thereby changing itself and blending observer and observed just as 
a paradox blends opposites. Moreover, an observer observing 
itself is obviously self-referential and it also goes round and 
round since it observes itself observing itself observing itself 
and so on and on. All three conditions for a paradoxical loop are 
met and so an observer observing itself defines a paradoxical 
state of affairs, a paradoxical reality. 
Therefore, a reality that includes the observer constructing 
this same reality is a paradoxical reality. It blends observer 
and observed: observer and its niche become one. It is no longer 
necessary for the observer to assume the environment as a separate 
entity and so this paradoxical reality belongs to the perspective 
of the observer as an individual being (see "The world"). 
Consequently, an observer can choose a paradoxical perspective 
of the world and become one with it. Another observer that also 
chooses a paradoxical perspective of the world cannot, however, 
share this perspective with the first observer since an observer 
cannot be inside the other. Observers are independent autonomous 
unities. However, observers can., if they choose to do so, orient 
each other, thereby constructing a common reality "out there". 
This situation can be pictured most clearly in the following 
metaphor: two observers interact and let us assume that each of 
them has a Moebius band that represents (in this metaphor) its 
paradoxical perspective of the world. Each observer is free to 
contemplate the whole or part of its own band, but can only con- 
template part of the band of the other observer. Therefore, from 
one observer's point of view, the other observer's band is only a 
two-sided surface. Moreover, that part of each band that both can 
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contemplate, can be made to coincide and hence the observers can 
construct a two-sided reality "out there". They will retain, 
however, their respective one-sided views of the world. In fact, 
the observers (and clearly there could be more than two) can make 
a description of the world "out there" in logical terms writing on 
their coinciding two-sided surfaces the logical propositions that 
mirror the world: they construct a common logical reality by 
writing on one side all true propositions and on the other side, 
all false propositions. Whether a proposition is true or false is 
determined by a comparison with the assumed logical reality. If 
difficulties arise (e. g. paradoxes), the reality is adjusted in 
such a way to eliminate the difficulties (e. g. "resolve" the 
paradoxes). On this common two-sided part of the band, the observ- 
ers could include all the propositions of logic and mathematics 
and everything would be fine with them, as long as they limit 
their observation to the common two-sided region of the band. 
However, each observer can choose to perceive the whole of its own 
band, that is a one-sided surface. Opposites become one and all 
the propositions on the band, including all the propositions of 
logic and mathematics, appear to be true and false, i. e. they 
become paradoxical from this individual (paradoxical) perspec- 
t ve. 
* Moreover, the whole logical reality supported by these 
propositions crumbles from this perspective because paradoxes can- 
not picture the assumed logical reality. 
This reminds of Wittgenstein, op cit.: Proposition 4.0621 
.9 the sign 'non' corresponds to nothing in reality". 
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If the observers restrict their perspective to the common two- 
sided part of the band, thereby becoming social (logical) beings, 
everything falls into place again and they recover their logical 
reality. 
According to Wittgenstein, contradictions and tautology are 
aspects of all propositions. * 
Our considerations take us to the conclusion that all proposi- 
tions of logic and mathematics are paradoxical as seen from the 
individual (paradoxical) viewpoint. 
Therefore, all the propositions of logic are seen as tautolo- 
gies or contradictions (the terms equal each other or oppose each 
other) from a logical (social) viewpoint (i. e. from the inside) 
and as paradoxes (the terms blend into each other) from an indivi- 
dual (paradoxical) viewpoint (i. e. from the outside). 
From the logical viewpoint the sense of the world (of logic) 
lies outside the world (of logic) and the subject does not belong 
to the world (of logic). ** This is because the subject (a living 
organism, autopoietic) is paradoxical*** and consequently does not 
belong to the world mirrored by logic. 
Finally, the view from the outside renders the mirror image of 
the non-paradoxical aspects of the world useless to picture the 
Wittgenstein, op. cit.: Proposition 5.143 and Propositions 
6.191 6.1131 6.111. 
Wittgenstein, op. cit.: Propositions 6.41,5.631,5.632 
*** See Chapter 2 
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world from the perspective of the individual, one that allows for 
the concurrent existence and non-existence of state of affairs. A 
surprising view of the world indeed, impossible from the perspec- 
tive of logic and mathematics. 
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CHAPTER 2 
INTERACTIONS AMONG UNITIES 
Unities 
Unities are state of affairs. 
Unities have properties of themselves and properties that 
relate them to other unities. 
The properties of a unity are determined by the way this 
unity is defined, and not by particular properties of its com- 
ponents. 
A unity is defined by the relations between its components 
which realize the unity as a whole. It is these relations which 
constitute the organization of the unity. 
Unities can be closed or open with respect to other unities. 
If a unity opens with respect to an observer (also a unity), for 
example, the observer can write a protocol of inputs and outputs 
for the unity and derive from it an open model (another open 
unity). Then, the observer can predict, deduce, in the open 
model, the behaviour of the unity. However, as long as the 
observer is unable to construct an open model for the unity, the 
unity remains a closed one and its behaviour will be unpredictable 
from the observer's point of view. In order to know about a 
closed unity, the observer can only construct a closed model of 
it, i. e. another closed unity. 
Example 






A moves to the right a random number of steps. B moves to the 
left a random number of steps. Both are closed unities with 
respect to an external observer and with respect to each other 
since their behaviour is random with respect to all concerned. 
Eventually A and B will meet and they will not separate afterwards 
since A will continue to try to move to the right and B will try 
to move to the left. This new unity "AB" will move randomly 
either to the left or right depending on the result of the 
attempted movements of A and B, e. g., if A tries to move 5 steps 
to the right and B tries to move 7 steps to the left, the movement 
of "AB" will be 2 steps to the lef t, and so on. Thus "AB" moves 
randomly with respect to the external observer but A and B no 
longer move randomly with respect to "AB", i. e., A and B are now 
open unities with respect to "AB" and with respect to each other. 
"AB" is a closed unity with respect to the observer. Of course A 
and B remain closed with respect to the observer. 
A similar situation arises when unities "move" randomly with 
respect to each other in spaces of more dimensions and fewer 
restrictions. Couplings more elaborate than simple contact will 
then be necessary, but once the couplings have been made, the 
closed unities will integrate and open with respect to a new and 
larger closed unity, which in turn can become part of and open 
with respect to an even larger unity, and so on and on. Of 
course, the process can also be reversed by the spontaneous decay 
of the component unities or by the spontaneous breaking of the 
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coupling. The componens would become closed unities again. The 
different spaces and couplings may not be only physical but also 
chemical, electric, biological, magnetic, mechanical, gravita- 
tional, psychological, geographical, social, etc., etc. In 
general, the couplings will restrict the "movement" of the com- 
ponent unities, but if the unities are complex they can generate a 
.1 movement" into a different space, thereby disengaging their 
coupling(s) and recovering their original, or even a new freedom. 
Autopoiesis 
Living organisms belong to the class of autopoietic unities 
and as such their organization is the autopoietic organization, 
which is defined as a network of productions of components which 
i) participate recursively in the same network of productions of 
components which produced these same components, and ii) realize 
the network of productions as a unity in the space in which the 
components exist. 
Thus, an autopoietic unity continuously generates its own 
organization through its operation as a system of production of 
its own components, and does this in an endless turnover of coM7 
ponents under conditions of continuous perturbations and compen- 
sations for perturbations. 
Autopoetic unities 
Autopoietic unities are closed unities (having neither inputs 
nor outputs) formed by originally closed unities that become part 
of and open with respect to the autopoietic unity which they 
integrate. 
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The closed model for autopoiesis, * with the following key: 
* catalyst 
4o substrate 
o link (unbonded) 
* link (bonded, end of chain) 
* link (bonded) 
Interactions 
(1) Composition: + 2- 0+ 
(2) Concatenation: 0+00 4-+ 
++ +0 => +0+ 
+oooooooo+ +0 => +*0»***«+ 
(3) Disintegration: 0 => 2- 
is an autopoietic unity whose building blocks (catalyst, sub- 
strate, unbonded links) are closed unities (with respect to each 
other and an external observer) that move randomly in the habitat 
(restricted two-dimensional space); unbonded links meet, become 
bonded links and move no more (at least with respect to the chain 
of bonded links), and consequently become part of and open with 
respect to the autopoietic unity which they integrate. They can 
still be closed with respect to the external observer. If the 
chain of bonded links closes upon itself enclosing the catalyst, 
the unbonded links produced within the enclosure by Interaction 
(1) can replace in the chain, via (2), the bonded links that 
decay as a result of (3). See Figure 2.1. 
The properties of this organization as a unity are not deter- 
mined by the properties of its component unities (as defined in 
*Varela, F., Maturana, H., and Uribe, R.: "Autopoiesis: the Orga- 
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Interactions). The properties of the autopoietic unity are deter- 
mined by the constitution of this unity, and are, in f act, the 
properties of the network created by, and creating, its compo- 
nents. Therefore, the paradoxical nature of this organization 
should be evident from the comparison of the following contra- 
dictory circularity with the Moebius band and the paradoxical 
propositions that mirror it (see Chapter 1): 
(i) Unbonded links are produced within the enclosure by 
Interaction (1); corresponds to no twist. 
(ii) Unbonded links replace in the chain, via (2), the 
bonded links that decay as a result of (3); corresponds 
to no twist. 
(iii) The enclosure prevents the escape of the catalyst, 
thereby ensuring the regeneration of this same enclo- 
sure and the survival of the autopoietic unity; 
corresponds to no twist. 
(iv) The enclosure decays as a result of (3), compromising 
the survival of the autopoietic unity; corresponds to 
the twist, and also closes the self-referential loop. 
* 
The paradoxical nature of autopoiesis makes the unity differ- 
ent from itself through a constant turnover of components. Only 
its (circular, self-referential, paradoxical) organization is 
maintained. 
Strictly, the twist can be anywhere in the loop or not be 
there at all; just as in the Moebius band, it depends on the 
observer's perspective. 
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Autopoiesis and self -organization are concepts relative to an 
observer: if an autopoietic unity opens with respect to an 
observer, it becomes allopoietic with respect to that observer. 
Thus, if an observer knows, for example, the "seed" of the pseudo- 
random number that generates the closed model for autopoiesiS, ** 
and hence can construct an open model of the closed model and 
deduce with certainty its behaviour, the closed model becomes open 
and therefore no longer an autopoietic unity, for that observer. 
Autopoietic unities are closed paradoxical unities that can 
relate to other autopoietic unities through a reciprocal opening 
that will tend to create a new larger unity (which may be either 
autopoietic or not). Examples: cells, which are autopoietic uni- 
ties, become open (and hence allopoietic) with respect to the 
multicellular living organism (autopoietic unity) which they 
integrate; neurons (autopoietic) become open (allopoietic) with 
respect to the nervous system (allopoietic); ants (autopoietic) 
become allopoietic with respect to the anthill (autopoietic). 
Cells, neurons and ants remain autopoietic with respect to an 
external observer. 
Autopoietic unities such as living organisms are complex uni- 
ties that behave in spaces of many dimensions (physical or other- 
wise, as stated before). This richness of behavior is restricted, 
however, by the behaviour of the unities that constitute their 
environment through the couplings, more or less rigid and more or 
less permanent, that will develop among unities. As a result of 
* G. Pask: "An Approach to Cybernetics" (Ref. 24) 
** Varela, Maturana and Uribe: op. cit. 
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these couplings, autopoietic unities can become allopoietic with 
respect to the larger unity (autopoietic or not) that they inte- 
grate, for example, the cell in the multicellular organism, the 
ant in the anthill, the human being in society. When this is the 
case, the decay (death) or generation (birth) of the component 
unities are simply aspects of the behaviour of the larger com7 
posite unity. 
Survival 
To explore their niche * autonomous unities (e. g. living orga- 
nisms) act paradoxically rejecting the stable, secure, to plunge 
into chaos in search of a new stable, secure place, only to leave 
it sooner or later. This action implies a rejection of the pre- 
sent state of affairs and a prediction (implicit or explicit) 
about the new state of affairs which may or may not include other 
autonomous unities. This prediction is based on an induction 
made on a model of their niche (environment) and/or on a deduc- 
tion (computation) made in a simulation of their niche (environ- 
ment . 
** 
The survival of an autonomous unity is intimately related to 
its interactions with the environment (which may include other 
autonomous unities): if the unity can predict with a certain 
degree of confidence the behaviour of its environment it will, 
for example, be able to catch its prey and escape its predator. 
When a larger unity is created from the interactions of many 
individuals, the main goal becomes the survival of the larger 
* or environment. See Chapter 1, "The world% 
** See Chapter 4, I-fodelling and simulating". 
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unity even at the expense of the individual component unities. 
For example, it is known that certain desert rodents will risk 
their own lives in order to distract the predator away from the 
flock; soldiers go to war because they are convinced that they 
are saving their nation from the enemy; of course, the soldiers 
of the enemy are convinced similarly with respect to their own 
nation; and so they kill each other in war only to realize, too 
late, that they had nothing personal against the other soldier. 
Therefore, the survival of the individual organism depends on 
its paradoxical (unpredictable) behaviour with respect to other 
individual organisms. However, the survival of the community 
(larger unity) of individuals requires a logical (predictable) 
behaviour of the individual at least with respect to the larger 
unity. 
The behaviour of a unity can be logical, that is predictable 
or it can be paradoxical, that is unpredictable, depending on the 
point of view of the observer. 
Consequently we can distinguish different kinds of interac- 
tions among two unities A and B: 
(i) The behaviour of both unities is unpredictable (para- 
doxical) with respect to each other. The unities will 
remain autonomous. No lasting interaction may develop. 
(ii) The behaviour of unity A is predictable (logical) with 
respect to unity B, but the behaviour of this latter is 
unpredictable (paradoxical) with respect to A. A loses 
its autonomy with respect to B and a larger unity may 
be formed with A totally submitted to B. A becomes 
prey of B in the most ample meaning of the word. 
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(iii) The behaviour of B is-predictable with respect to A but 
the behaviour of A is unpredictable with respect to B. 
Same as (ii) but now B is submitted to A. 
(iv) The behaviours of A and B are predictable with respect 
to each other. A new larger unity is formed, and the 
goals of A and B become subservient to the goals of the 
larger unity AB. 
Unities A or B can also be composite unities. Moreover, in 
all last three cases the interacting unities can recover their 
autonomy through a paradoxical (creative) exploration out of the 
larger unity. 
These different kinds of relative behaviour are not necessar- 
ily given a priori as characteristics of each unity but rather, 
they are, for example, the result of unchecked logical (predict- 
able) behaviour of these unities, like certain ants enslaving 
others, or human beings that become armies and dictators that 
oppress their own people. 
Autopoiesis arises spontaneously among unities of different 
degrees of complexity, is sustained by the relations between the 
components that realize it, and may disintegrate spontaneously 
into disorder. 
Living organisms are autopoietic unities and as such they are 
organizationally closed unities. However, it is part of their 
definition as autopoietic unities the fact that they open and 
close, without loss of identity, in the universe in which they are 
realized. Consequently they are constantly exploring their 
environment creating the possibility of attaching (or being 
attached to) other unities (autopoietic or not) that will (or will 
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not) satisfy their autopoiesis. In this process, a larger (so- 
cial) organizationally closed unity (autopoietic or not) may be 
formed and the autonomy of the component unities will fade away. 
Multicellular organisms were created in this fashion, making 
cells (autopoietic unities) subservient to the autopoiesis of the 
larger multicellular unity. Component cells became specialized 
and some of them formed the nervous system interacting among 
themselves with a "language" made of nerve impulses. This 
"language" is isolated from the external environment of the 
multicellular organism as can be seen from the principle of 
undifferentiated encoding. * This "language .. is the basis for 
individual knowledge as different from social knowledge which 
uses a language that operates with the sense organs outside the 
organism, and which allows the interaction with other multicellu- 
lar organisms with a similar language. This is the birth of new 
larger unities (simbiosis, fish colonies, herds, anthills, bee- 
hives, clubs, political parties, etc. ) that will, sooner or later 
render the integrating unities subservient to the goals of the 
larger unity. 
Consequently, the language of interaction can be seen from 
more than one perspective. From the point of view of the com- 
ponent unities it is a logical language outside themselves; from 
the point of view of the larger unity it is a paradoxical 
"language" inside itself. 
Therefore, a living organism becomes an individual (paradoxi- 
cal) observer when it interacts recursively with itself through 
* H. von Foerster, 1976. 
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its thoughts (descriptions, representations of interactions). It 
becomes a social (logical) observer when it interacts with itself 
or other observers through its senses. 
A human observer is an autopoietic unity who learns and cre- 
ates its environment through intentions of predicting the envi- 
ronment's behaviour. In this environment dwell other autopoietic 
unities (including itself), and they are subject to the same 
intention of predicting their behaviours by the observer. Even- 
tually two or more observers (autopoietic unities) become coupled 
through one or more domains of interaction, they integrate a 
larger unity (couple, family, tribe, community, society), lose 
their autonomy and eventually their own autopoiesis (i. e. they 
become allopoietic at least with respect to the larger unity). 
The complexity (and richness) of human behaviour allows the 
breaking of the couplings and the restoration of autonomy and 
autopoiesis in certain cases. But excessive training (including 
self-training), as opposed to learning, of whatever sort reduces 
the dimensions of behaviour of an autopoietic unity and makes 
probable its coupling with autopoietic unities subject to a simi- 
lar training. New, larger unities are formed, which render the 
component unities allopoietic. Examples of these are the military 
(and similar) institutions. Sometimes the training is forced, as 
in oppressive governments or institutions, sometimes it is there 
in more subtle ways through "education", "cultural" legacies, 
economic pressures and the like. Either way, results are the 
same: closed autopoietic unities open with respect to the larger 
unities which they integrate. It is possible that some may 
spontaneously, creatively, become closed (paradoxical) again. 
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CHAPTER 
TIME AND SPACE 
Preliminaries 
Unities are dependent on the perspective chosen by the 
observer. They are simple if considered as unanalizable wholes 
and complex if they are considered made of component unities. If 
simple, unities become, for the observer, the spaceless Here and 
the timeless Now. In the present context an object will be the 
spaceless Here and an event, the timeless Now. Therefore, a grid 
in which objects create events and vice versa, does not create 
time or space (see Chapter 1): 
il ObJ2 J Obj4 Ob ObJ3 
"Objects" creating "Events" and vice versa 
(von Foerster, 1976) 
A unity is defined through a distinction made by an observer 
or by the unity itself (e. g. if the unity is organizationally 
closed, see Chapter 4). 
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All unities change. * However, the observer can choose 
perspectives, usually through gross approximations performed by 
its senses, from which unities change into themselves. ** In this 
manner, the observer defines a relatively stable universe(s) for 
itself. But'. together with this apparent stability, the observer 
brings the possibility of space and time into its universe(s). In 
a changing world there are no such things as space or time: there 
is no reference for them and without reference there is no space 
or time. 
In other words: unities change, but the observer makes 
arbitrary distinctions that cause (from its perspective) the uni- 
ties to change into themselves. Consequently, the constancy 
(identity) of objects in time is not something that we discover in 
or learn from our environment, we, as observers, do it (invent 
it), through distinctions in space (descriptions). Likewise, the 
constancy (identity) of events in space is something that we, as 
observers, do (invent), through distinctions in time (processes). 
But space and time do not exist prior to these distinctions. 
Now, to make distinctions in time and/or space correspond to 
the construction of a reality "out there", that is, a logical 
reality, supported (constructed) by one or more social (logical) 
Change implies process, which is a more fundamental notion than 
time or space (see Chapter 4). 
Every sequence of changes that leads, through the distinctions 
made by the observer, to a recreation of a state of affairs 
(a 
unity) over and over, constitutes a cycle, that is, a clock that 
can synchronize (events in) the universe(s) of the observer. 
The clock (cycle) itself is asynchronous but its effects are 
synchronous. A cycle is asynchronous when analyzed, and 
synchronous if considered as an unanalizable whole. 
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observers that orient each other through that same reality (or 
environment), as we saw before ("The world", Chapter 1). 
Therefore, space and time are generated recursively by an 
observer that, adopting a logical perspective, makes distinctions 
in a space and/or time that are created by these same distinc- 
tions. This suggests that distinction (description, process) is a 
more fundamental notion than space and time (see Chapter 4). 
For an observer that chooses a paradoxical perspective, there 
is no space or time. Change (a*a) is the case from a paradoxical 
perspective and nothing is equal to itself. Paradoxical state of 
affairs change themselves. 
Consequently, the same observer, selecting different perspec- 
tives, can be a paradoxical observer for whom there is neither 
space nor time, or a logical observer that recursively creates 
time and space through distinctions in these same space and time. 
Time 
Time has come much too often to the help of paradox hunters so 
they can "explain certain paradoxes away". Typical is the case of 
the buzzer circuit, which we discussed in Chapter 1. The buzzer 
circuit can be studied further considering its combinational logic 
analog, an inverter gate with feedback: 
T P4 F 
FT [H 
An inverter gate is such that its output is true when the 
input is false, and false when the input is true. With the feed- 
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back loop, the situation is "impossible" in timeless logic since 
the loop has made true =f alse, i. e. the output (and the input) 
are true and false, obviously a contradiction. Or even more, a 
paradox, since there is self-reference, contradiction and vicious 
circle. If the input is true, it is false; if it is false, it is 
true, and the same happens with the output, a situation which is 
perfectly possible in the realm of paradoxes. How is the 
"impossible" situation "resolved" in logic? ... 
In logical terms, if p represents a state of affairs and p 
implies q (which represents another state of affairs), this gives 
no indication of a relation of succession in time between p and q, 
rather it expresses their co-existing truth. This is alright as 
long as q is different from not-p, because then the Law of Contra- 
diction will not preclude us from the coexistence of p and q. 
However, it is this same law which will force us to a successive- 
ness in "time" of p and q when q is the same as not-p. Two oppo- 
site states cannot be simultaneous. 
It may be argued that there is no "ideal" inverter gate in the 
world and that any "real" gate has a time delay, i. e. if the value 
changes at the input say, from true to false, the output will not 
change from false to true until a certain time tD (the time delay 
of the gate) has elapsed. Everything works fine now because we 




And so when we close the loop, there is no conflict anymore 
because any change at 0 will affect (with no time delay) only up 
to Il (the input to tD). Therefore if 0 changes from true to 
false, Il will change from false to true, but 0 will change from 
false to true only after t D' hence there is no conflict. But an 
oscillation develops because when 0 changes from false to true, it 
generates a new change of itself from true to false after t., and 




I. t . *-t - " D. " 
Consequently, the time delay introduced, has apparently 
replaced the timeless paradoxical situation for an oscillation 
that occurs as time is un folded. If tD -> 0, we approach the 
ideal situation and the frequency of the oscillation increases 
without bound. At D= 
0 corresponds to a closed loop. If tD 
becomes large, the frequency of oscillation decreases and a very 
large tD will correspond to an open loop. Therefore, the time 
delay is "something" between an open and a closed feedback loop, 
i. something between having and not having a feedback loop. 
Something between having and not having contradictory self- 
reference, something between having and not having paradox. 
It appears that time is necessary to avoid the coexistence of 
the opposites. The existence of opposites defines time a priori, 
since some time must elapse when one goes from one to the other, 
much as Spencer Brown refers to the appearance of time when one 
makes a distinction. It takes time to go from the inside to the 
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outside, it takes time to cross the distinction. This is clearly 
not the case in the domain of paradoxes, where the co-existence of 
opposites is not challenged. We can be both inside and outside 
the distinction and hence it makes no sense to go from the 
"inside" to the "outside" or vice versa: time and cross are 
irrelevant (non-sensical). 
Therefore, the unfolding of time liberates periodic phenomena 
(e. g. oscillations) that otherwise would remain as timeless para- 
doxes. Without these oscillations, very little, if anything at 
all, would exist for the logical observer in the logical world. 
However, time (and space) is an invention of the logical observer. 
Time can not be perceived through the senses. The passage of time 
-- there is no such thing -- can only be compared with the 
workings of a process, like a chronometer (which is also an 
oscillator). 
In consequence of different waters flowing, says Heraclitus, 
we at the same time enter yet do not enter the same river. This 
suggests that for any given identity we both are and are not. 
Therefore, we can and cannot enter the same "flow of events". But 
also we, as living organisms, are always changing, always flowing 
and hence are and are not, being able and unable to experience the 
same state of affairs. 
Time and Space 
Subjects are paradoxical state of affairs. They are living 
organisms and as such they explore paradoxically their niche 
rejecting the stable, secure, to plunge into chaos in search of a 
new stable, secure place, only to leave it sooner or later. This 
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behaviour entails a loop that will be called the exploratory loop 
and can be represented by: 
CHAOS 
ORDER 
As long as the individual organism behaves paradoxically, the 
exploratory loop is a timeless and spaceless paradox. However, a 
logical interaction with other organisms requires a logical behav- 
iour., distinctions in time and space are made by the observers 
between chaos and order, and time and space result (are created) 
as a consequence of these same distinctions (see Preliminaries). 
This time and this space make the behaviour of the individual orga- 
nism to oscillate between order and chaos in the exploratory loop. 
Occasionally the observer returns (creatively) to the timeless and 
spaceless paradoxical behaviour. But, as the individual becomes 
part of a larger unity, the oscillation (and creativity) slows 
down making the paradoxical behaviour rare. 
Time and space are relative to the observer. Therefore, a 
paradoxical behaviour, which is timeless and spaceless for the 
organism that is behaving paradoxically, can take place in time 
and space with respect to an external observer. 
Consequently, for an observer observing itself (see Chapter 
1). time and space are unfolded when the paradoxical behaviour is 
abandoned, and conversely, when the paradoxical behaviour is 
resumed, time and space vanish. 
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CHAPTER 4 
ORGANIZATIONALLY CLOSED UNITIES 
Modelling and simulating 
Modelling and simulating are sometimes carelessly confused 
and treated as synonyms. As we shall see, however, there is a 
fundamental difference between the two. 
In Chapter 3 we saw that unities (state of affairs) are 
defined through distinctions and that a universe for a given 
observer is the set of unities that the observer chooses to con- 
sider (dintinguish). Therefore, one unity can be a universe for 
a given observer. 
We also saw in Chapter 2, that autonomous unities (e. g. 
living organisms) distinguish themselves and deal with their 
niches (environments) through predictions based on a model (open 
or closed) or simulation of it. However, in order to do this, an 
observer has to choose first a perspective (logical or paradox- 
ical) and then define (distinguish) the universe or universes 
that will be considered. 
A simulation for a given unity is made in a universe (the 
simulator) different from the one of the unity and its components. 
No distinction is made by the observer (or by the simulation) be- 
tween simulation and simulator. Therefore, the simulation is not 
another unity, and hence, a simulation cannot be organizationally 
closed, it is organizationally open. It is treated by the log- 
ical observer as a "process" in which a relation or "classical 
model" is satisfied between inputs and outputs (see Pask, 1981). 
Consequently, a simulation implies a logical perspective. 
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The universe(s) of a model and that (those) of the modeled 
unity can be the same or different. A model (closed for the 
observer) (see "Unities", Chapter 2) is another unity distin- 
guished by itself or by the observer in the same universe(s) in 
which its components are distinguished. Therefore, a model can be 
organizationally closed (i. e. distinguish itself) and invite a 
paradoxical perspective from the observer. 
A nervous system or an unconventional computer* can be a 
universe(s) where models can be distinguished; however, a conven- 
tional computer or a nervous system (e. g. that of a mathematician 
or logician) solving a mathematical (or logical) problem are simu- 
lators. Consequently, there is no such thing as a mathematical 
(or logical) model. 
In a mathematical (or logical) simulation it is possible to 
deduce (compute) the future behaviour of the simulation ("'Neces- 
sity' arises from the ability to make infallible deductions" ** ). 
In a model (organizationally open or closed for the observer) 
it is impossible to deduce the future. Only induction is possible 
("'Chance' arises from the inability to make infallible induc- 
tions , ** ). 
Modelling is doing another unity. 
Simulating is making the simulator (a unity) act like the 
simulated unity. 
A model can be organizationally closed. 
A simulation is organizationlly open. 
* See "A set of microcomputers", Chapter 5. 
** von Foerster, 1976. 
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Interactions and information transfer 
As we saw in Chapter 1 ("The world") , when several observers 
(organizationally closed unities) interact they can only orient 
each other within their respective cognitive domains. This 
suggests that nothing is, in fact, communicated between the ob- 
servers. 
Information is a relative concept and information transfer 
(communication) is an observer's interpretation of the interaction 
between two or more unities (which could include the (logical) 
observer itself). 
In Heinz von Foerster's words (von Foerster, 1976): 
"Information is a relative concept that assumes 
meaning only when related to the cognitive structure of 
the observer of an utterance (the 'recipient'). " 
"The information associated with a description 
depends on an observer's ability to draw inferences from 
this description. 
'Necessity' arises from the ability to make infallible 
deductions. 
'Chance' arises from the inability to make infallible 
inductions. " 
"Consequently, chance and necessity are concepts that 
do not apply to the world, but to our attempts to create 
(a description of) it. " 
"The environment contains no information; the environ- 
ment is as it is. " 
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Therefore, if an observer is unable to draw inferences from a 
certain utterance, no information can be associated with it. 
(This is clearly observer dependent). For example, if the utter- 
ance observed by the "recipient" happens to be a paradox, the ob- 
server would not be able to draw inferences from it. No informa- 
tion is associated with a paradox (or a paradoxical description). 
As we said above, information transfer is an observer's inter- 
pretation of the interaction between two or more unities (which 
could include the observer itself). But this interpretation 
assumes an environment "out there" (e. g. the interacting unities) 
and so it corresponds to a logical (non-paradoxical) perspective 
of the world (see Chapter 1) . 
Therefore, from a logical viewpoint, unities are infor- 
mationally open and information transfer, e. g. through local 
synchronization of a priori asynchronous unities may occur in any 
logical interaction among independent unities. Moreover, a 
conflict between two (or more) independent unities is also an 
observer's logical interpretation of the interaction among these 
unities. And the resolution of this "conflict" (e. g. through a 
bifurcation principle) implies information transfer only in the 
eyes of the beholder: the observer's logical perspective. 
From a paradoxical perspective, no environment is assumed and 
paradoxical unities are informationally closed, i. e. there is no 
information transfer between them. 
Therefore, the concepts of information, conflict between inde- 
pendent unities, information transfer and communication are the 
consequence of a logical, organizationally open, perspective of 
the world. 
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From a paradoxical perspective of the world, organizationally 
closed unities interact paradoxically, without communication. 
Organizational closure 
"The concept of organizational closure has become 
synonymous with the concept of "stability" in a dynamic 
and generalized sense. " 
"The concept has appeared, though not explicitly men- 
tioned, in many contexts and reflects a very fundamental 
change in thinking about what systems are and what sta- 
bility is. " 
"Every (distinguishable) systenr-whole (unity) is 
(distinguishable through its stable properties arising 
from it being) organizationally closed" (see Varela 1976 
and Pask 1977). 
In a biological context, organizational closure has received a 
definite expression in the concept of autopoiesis (Chapter 2). 
(See Maturana, 1972; Varela, Maturana and Uribe, 1974; Maturana 
and Varela, 1976; and Ben-Eli, 1981). Autopoietic systems are 
organizationally closed and organizational closure is a charac- 
teristic of life. 
As we saw before (Chapter 3), a unity can be distinguished 
by an observer as a simple unanalyzable whole or as a complex 
unity made of simple unanalyzable component unities that interact 
through relations or processes. 
Unities can be organized through distinctions by the observer 
or by the unity itself, into systems or into systems-wholes. Sys- 
tems have a hierarchical organization, e. g. a tree of hierarchical 
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processes: systems are organizationally open. System-wholes 
have a closed organization, e. g. a circular network of inter- 
actions: systent-wholes are organizationally closed, i. e. they 
organize themselves. 
The "wholeness" of a unity is embodied in its organizational 
closure. An organizationally closed unity is not the sum of its 
component unities; it is the organizational closure of its com- 
ponent unities. Moreover, when organizationally closed unities 
interact, a new organizational closure may arise among these 
interacting unities. However, from the point of view of the new 
larger unity the component unities have "inputs" and "outputs"; 
in fact they are organizationally open from this perspective 
(see Chapter 2). 
Organizational closure does not imply interactional closure. 
However, interactions can be logical or paradoxical depending on 
the perspective chosen. From a paradoxical perspective, organ- 
izationally closed unities distinguish themselves and are infor- 
mationally closed. From a logical perspective, logical interac- 
tions are required for the observer to be able to distinguish 
these unities that must be informationally open from this per- 
spective. 
In order to "explain" (and "understand") a complex unity, 
the observer, as a social (logical, organizationally open) being 
(see Introduction and Chapter 1), creates arbitrary hierarchies 
through (arbitrary) distinctions inside the unity. Conse- 
quently, if the organization of the unity is closed, its organi- 
zational closure will not be reflected in this "explanation". 
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The observer, as an individual (paradoxical, organizationally 
closed) being, does not explain organizationally closed unities, 
it interacts paradoxically with them as a component of one or more 
new larger unities. 
Therefore, all hierarchies, and the no less arbitrary notions 
of "inputs" and "outputs", are the consequence of a logical, or- 
ganizationally open perspective of the world (see Introduction). 
Organizational closure, as autopoiesis, involves change and so 
it also implies a paradoxical loop. All organizationally closed 
unities belong to the paradoxical aspect of the world. Therefore, 
only an observer that adopts a paradoxical perspective can inter- 
act (paradoxically) with an organizationally closed unity. 
For an observer assuming a logical perspective, a closed or- 
ganization (paradoxical loop) is unconceivable and so this ob- 
server can only interact (logically) with (and "understand") an 
organizationally closed unity either by assuming inputs and out- 
puts into and from it, i. e. making the unity organizationally 
open; or otherwise, by analyzing the unity as made of components 
(with inputs and outputs) that do not even suggest the closure of 
the unity. 
Consequently, organizationally closed unities are the only 
unities in a paradoxical reality, i. e. in the world of the 




At this point we will introduce the notions of-condition and 
event proposed by Holt and Commoner (1970) while they were asking 
themselves: "Of what does a system consist? For example, should 
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we take processors, inputs and outputs as the elementary entities 
of which they are made? Do they have states? Do they take space 
(or is it only their realizations which do)? When they operate, 
do they take time? Etc. Etc Holt and Commoner suggest also 
the notions of holding, (of a condition) and occurrence (of an 
event). These can be grasped most easily since intuitively con- 
ditions hold and events occur. However, at least in our context, 
no time or space are assumed or implied by these notions. We 
shall call the occurrence of an event, a process, and the holding 
of a condition, a description (see Chapter 3, "Preliminaries"). 
The concepts of concurrent processes and concurrent descrip- 
tions will also appear in our discussion. Two or more concurrent 
processes (or descriptions) are such that they are not ordered 
with respect to one another, i. e. they take place in different 
universes or independent processors. 
* 
Process and description are more fundamental notions than time 
and space. 
** 
Therefore, instead of postulating space and time, we can 
postulate one or more timeless and spaceless universes or indepen- 
dent processors that support processes and descriptions in a 
spaceless Here and timeless Now. 
A process is "fired" by a descripton so that it elicits a 
new description (see Petri, 1965 and Holt, 1970 and 1972). No 
Is A universe is an a priori independent processor, it is a set 
(the usual connotation of 'universe') but with action built into 
it" (Pask, 1981). 
** A careful consideration of our discussion in Chapter 3 
("Prelim- 
inaries") should make this statement appear less outrageous (see 
also Paský 1981). 
66 
components" or "storage medium" are assumed or involved in this 
occurrence. This is process (and description) without (or before) 
time and space. This corresponds to a paradoxical perspective. 
Moreover, with a finite number of descriptions and processes, 
the original assumption of universes or independent processors 
requires, as a condition sine qua non, one or more closed sets of 
processes (and descriptions). Otherwise, some description will 
not fire a process and the universes as conceived above (indepen- 
dent processors with action built into them) will collapse. All 
descriptions involved must change, i. e. they must fire a process. 
The closed set or processes and descriptions defines and main- 
tains itself as a paradoxical unity through the dynamic stability 
of organizational closure in the spaceless Here and timeless Now 
within those universes. Processes and descriptions in different 
universes are concurrent and all descriptions involved must fire a 
process in some universe(s); otherwise, organizational closure is 
lost as well as the universe(s) or independent processor(s). 
Assuming that no other organizationally closed unity (e. g. an 
external observer) interacts with the organizationally closed 
unity considered, this unity defines only one perspective, a para- 
doxical perspective. 
However, if another organizationally closed unity (that could 
be an external observer), with its own paradoxical perspective, 
different processes and descriptions and within other universes 
(or independent processors), interacts with the first one in the 
same spaceless Here and timeless Now, some universes may encounter 
descriptions that do not fire their own processes. If this is the 
case, these descriptions are not changed, i. e. they "remain" (or 
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they are "changed" into themselves) and, as a consequence, they 
define a storage medium (space and time) within such universes and 
a logical perspective for the interacting unities (that may 
include an external observer). 
From this logical perspective, the dynamic stability of organ- 
izational closure becomes static, i. e. organizational closure 
itself is lost, the descriptions become "real" objects or conr- 
ponents (distinctions (or descriptions) in space), the processes 
become "real" events (distinctions (or processes) in time) and the 
processors occupy space and time ("The 'thing' secreted from the 
process, " see A. Holt, 1972). 
It is interesting to observe that even though organizational 
closure is lost from the logical perspective, this same organiza- 
tional closure is essential for the emergence of the logical per- 
spective out of a timeless and spaceless origin. 
Moreover, from a logical perspectiveg the processors are 
machines, abstract or otherwise, that produce components ("out- 
puts") from other components ("inputs"). In order to do this they 
must containg according to this viewpoint, in some form of storage 
medium a "look-up table" that enables them to match the "input" to 
the corresponding "output". Therefore3, the descriptions that 
It remain .0 and define the logical perspective also generate and 
modify precisely this "look-up table", i. e. the processors 
themselves. 
The descriptions generated by processes in one universe are 
stored making distinctions in space and time in another universe 
(the one where no process is fired by these descriptions) and vice 
versa. However) if some or all the universes share the same 
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storage medium, a common logical "reality" may develop for the 
interacting unities. This logical "reality" arises precisely from 
those descriptions that are not changed (or "changed" into them- 
selves) in some universe, i. e. from those descriptions that do not 
fire a process in some universe. The common storage medium be- 
comes an environment for the unities (their common space and 
time), in which they construct their logical (social) realities, 
including the "real" processors that support their processes and 
descriptions. 
From a logical perspective, a processor is process (in time) 
and storage or description (in space). If a paradoxical perspec- 
tive is approached, the whole logical reality can be made to 
vanish and so a processor becomes process (no time) and descrip- 
tion (no space) in the spaceless Here and timeless Now. 
It is a misconception to think that the "building blocks" "are 
there" a priori for the construction (invention) of a particular 
(logical) reality: be it the realities that we invent or those 
that we adopt, or be it these processors that we are now consider- 
ing. Remember that the "building blocks" (the "things") are se- 
creted from process. The "building blocks" that constitute the 
emergent logical reality are defined, distinguished, created, in- 
vented with this emergence and are not "there" a priori. There- 
fore, the processors are processes (no time) and descriptions (no 
space) at the outset (paradoxical perspective), they are no 
of things". It is only from the emergent logical perspective that 
these same processors become "things" (secreted from the processes) 
in time and space. 
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All activity in the storage medium (or environment) is trig- 
gered by descriptions that do not fire processes in a certain 
universe. Therefore, if these descriptions vanish or processes 
develop within the universes that are fired by these descrip- 
tions, the activity in the storage medium (or environment) may 
fade away and with it space, time and the logical perspective, 
that will be replaced by one or more paradoxical perspectives. 
Moreover, depending on the perspective (logical or paradox- 
ical) chosen by an observer, interactions among organizationally 
closed unities (including the observer) in these universes will 
be logical or paradoxical, i. e. will take place with or without 
information transfer; unities will or will not have inputs or 
outputs; time and space will or will not exist with respect to 
this observer. 
From a logical perspective two or more independent unities can 
only interact through the resolution of conflicts produced as 
these unities act on the same spacetime framework. Therefore, the 
existence of conflict is essential for this (logical) interaction; 
otherwise, a non-existent conflict cannot be resolved. The logi- 
cal perspective is reflected in the following comments: "Two dif- 
ferent events may only occur at the same place (e. g. the same 
location in a storage medium) if and only if they occur at dif- 
ferent times. " "Two different events may only occur at the same 
time if and only if they occur at different places (e. g. different 
locations in a storage medium). " From a logical viewpoint, these 
differences reflect independence. 
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From a paradoxical perspective, two or more independent uni- 
ties can interact without conflict resolution. (Logical) "con- 
flict" can coexist with paradoxical interactions. Or better, 
there is no conflict in a paradoxical interaction. The paradoxi- 
cal perspective is reflected in the following comment: "Two dif- 
ferent events may occur at the same time and place if they occur 
in different concurrent processors (universes). From a paradoxi- 
cal viewpoint, concurrence reflects independence. 
Therefore, it is from a paradoxical perspective that process 
and description emerge most clearly as more fundamental concepts 




MULTICOMPUTER. REALIZATION AND EXPERIMENTS 
A set of microcomputers 
Let us consider, from a logical perspective, a set of indepen- 
dent microcomputers. By independent we mean different (asynchron- 
ous) clocks and no a priori "communication" channel between them. 
These microcomputers are distinguished (by the logical observer) 
so that their boundaries are defined by those components whose 
states may be affected by the microcomputer's clock. As we shall 
soon see, these boundaries are not necessarily fixed. However, no 
microcomputer can grow inside the boundaries of another micro- 
computer. 
A description can be, in the microcomputers, part or all of a 
microcomputer word (2,4,8, .... bits) and a process is "fired" 
when that word (description) is changed into a new word (new 
description) that will in turn "fire" a new process, and so on and 
on. 
Consequently, the set of microcomputers considered can be a 
set of independent processors or universes that support processes 
and descriptions as discussed before. 
Each microcomputer has a RAM (Random Access Memory) where data 
(and programs) can be stored (see Figure 5.1). Using appropriate 
interfaces (e. g. tri-state bidirectional buffers that act like 
switches) part of this RAM can be completely detached from a 
microcomputer and be attached to another through an Address-Data 
Bus (ADB) and a Control Bus (CB). These two busses can also be 
attached to and detached from each microcomputer 
(using the same 
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type of buffer) thereby making part of the RAM of one microcom- 
puter accessible to another. With this architecture, each micro- 
computer can use part (RAM2 in Figure 5.1) of the RAM of another 
as a "mailbox" and modify its contents. What happens is that one 
microcomputer becomes "smaller" when it relinquishes part of its 
RAM (i. e. RAM2), and the other "grows" to include, inside its own 
boundaries, the busses (ADB and CB) and that RAM2. These modified 
microcomputers continue to be independent of each other; no 
synchronism or link binds them together. Therefore, the microcom- 
puters interact without becoming one. After the RAM2 contents has 
been modified, this RAM2 is returned to its original microcom- 
puter. The microcomputers remain independent and consequently, 
processes and descriptions in different microcomputers are con- 
current. 
Similarly, when a microcomputer becomes "smaller", it changes 
its boundaries by steering the internal busses away from its own 
RAM2. The microcomputer continues to execute its program with 
less RAM (i. e. only in RAMI). Appropriate software can make the 
partial loss of RAM totally irrelevant to the independence of the 
microcomputers. 
Consequently, the set of RAM2s may become the common storage 
medium, described before (Chapter 4), where the organizationally 
closed unities, supported by the processes and descriptions in the 
microcomputers, may construct their logical (social) realities 
including the "real" processors that support their processes and 
descriptions. Much as the observer creating space and time 
through distinctions in these same space and time (see Chapter 3). 
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If RAM2 is reduced to only one storage location (one computer 
word) a special case results and this unique It storage" location 
can be the spaceless Here and timeless Now, accessible to all 
microcomputers. This is because there is an essential difference 
in the access to this unique location as compared with the access 
to RAM2. Each microcomputer can access this unique location con- 
currently with other microcomputers. This has been realized 
through Port I of the microcomputers. Port I Bus (PIB) (see 
Figure 5.1) allows all the microcomputers to access concurrently 
this location. 
As we saw before, part or all of a microcomputer word (2,4, 
8 .... bits) is a description and a process is "fired" when a word 
(description) is changed into a new word (a new description) that 
will, in turn, "fire" a new process, and so on and on. There are 
2 2= 4 or 2 
4= 16 or 2 
8= 256, or .... possible different descriptions. 
If these descriptions are in PIB, the unique location 
described above, and if the set of corresponding processes fired 
by these descriptions happens to close upon itself (i. e. it be- 
comes closed) an organizationally closed unity defines itself in 
the spaceless Here and timeless Now, and with it a paradoxical 
perspective emerges. If another closed set of processes is fired 
by descriptions also in PIB, another organizationally closed unity 
emerges that can interact with the first one and a logical per- 
spective may arise for the interacting unities as explained before. 
It should be clear from our previous discussion that the organiza- 
tionally closed unities can be supported by processes and descrip- 
tions in one or more universes or independent processors (or 
microcomputers). 
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Moreover, since the processes and the processors that support 
the organizationally closed unities are generated by the interac- 
tions among these same processors, originally the universes 
(microcomputers) support no processes at all, i. e. at the "outset" 
there are no processors. 
From a logical perspective, the microcomputers change the 
contents of PIB according to a look-up table (stored in RAMI) 
that is "empty" (i. e. it produces no changes) at the outset but 
that is gradually "filled" (i. e. it produces changes) with new 
descriptions derived from the interactions with other emergent 
or existent) processors. The processors define (distinguish) 
themselves in space and time from the point of view of an exter- 
nal logical observer. However, for a processor to remain as 
such the set of processes that it supports by itself or with 
other processors must be closed; otherwise, it collapses. 
Therefore, a processor must be part or all of an organization- 
ally closed unity, i. e. paradoxical, i. e. timeless and space- 
less from a paradoxical perspective. 
Experimental set-up 
The microcomputers described above are universes or indepen- 
dent processors that can support concurrent processes and 
descriptions. 
Each microcomputer executes independently (concurrently) the 
program described by the flowchart of Figure 5.2. 
The initialization consists in: setting the values of flags 
and parameters as chosen by the experimenter; setting RAMI to 
OP192 .... F 
(the "empty" look-up table, i. e. no processors at the 
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outset); setting RAM2 to a random contents that may be inter- 
preted, by the logical observer, as the "noise" that starts the 
Is oscillation" of the organizationally closed unities; delaying 
the start of the rest of the program if so desired by the 
experimenter; and finally, setting PIB to a random description. 
After the initialization branch, the program consists essen- 
tially in following the "paradoxical loop" if the description (X) 
read from PlB (the common spaceless Here and timeless Now) fires 
a process in that universe, i. e. the contents of RAM1 addressed 
by X ([XI RAMO is different from X; or in following the "logi- 
cal loop", if the description (X) read from PlB does not fire a 
process in that universe, i. e. the contents of RAMI addressed 
by X( [XI RAMO is equal to X. 
In the paradoxical loop, change is the case and so the new 
description generated by the process fired by the description read 
from PlB, is written into PIB, i. e. [XI RAMI(*X) is written into 
PlB. 
In the logical loop, the storage medium and the processor are 
created and expanded by writing into the shared RAM2s the un- 
changed description (X) f rom PlB and into RAM1, X or the contents 
of RAM2 which is modified by other universes. 
The branches labeled with FLAGI in the logical loop allow the 
experimenter some (non-essential) variants around the (essential) 
description given above. 
(For details about the microcomputers and the experimental 
setup, please refer to the Appendix. ) 
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In the following experiments, the universes support no pro- 
cesses at the outset ("empty" look-up table), i. e. there are no 
processors. The activity in the different universes oscillates 
between the logical and the paradoxical loops (see Figure 5.2). 
After a dynamic (and/or "static") equilibrium is reached and 
depending on the particular experiment, the activity may remain in 
the logical loop, continue to oscillate between the two loops or 
remain in the paradoxical loop. A new universe added later may 
alter this situation temporarily or permanently. 
The particular organizationally closed unities formed are the 
result of interactions inside the set of universes chosen for the 
experiment and are not (are not) predefined or predetermined 
either by the structure (hardware) or function (software) of these 
universes nor by the particular properties of their "components" 
(descriptions). 
Petri Nets notation (Petri, 1965) is used to describe the 
activity of the network of universes after a dynamic and/or 
01 static" equilibrium has been reached. The symbol 
(i) 
repre- 
sents the description i and the symbol represents the firing of 
.j 
a process in universe j. Therefore, firings with different labels 




Description world: 0.1,2,3. 
B7 B6 B5 B4 B3 B2 
FLAG1= 010000 (See Figure 5.2) 
Dynamic stability reached: 
None 












Comments: No organizationally closed unities formed. Activity 




Description world: 0.1,2,3. 
B7 B6 B5 B4 B3 B2 
FLAGI= 100000 (See Figure 5.2) 
Dynamic stability reached: 








Comments: Some organizationally closed unities formed. The 





Description world: 01152,, 3,4,5,6,7,8,9, A, B, C, D, E, F. 
B7 B6 B5 B4 B3 B2 
FLAGI= 100000 (See Figure 5.2) 
Dynamic stability reached: 









7 397492B1 2CFF899 
6 5922406B218E492 
8099283cF23D9A97 
Comments: Some organizationally closed unities formed. The 
activity continues to oscillate between the logical and 
paradoxical loops. Notice the agreements in RAM2, 




Description world: 0,1,2,3. 
B7 B6 B5 B4 B3 B2 
FLAGI= 001000 (See Figure 5.2) 
Dynamic stability reached: 












Comments: Several organizationally closed unities formed with 
many corresponding agreements reached in RAM2. The 
activity remained in the paradoxical loop after some 





Description world: 0,1,2,3. 
B7 B6 B5 B4 B3 B2 
FLAGI= 011100 (See Figure 5-2) 
Dynamic stability reached: 












Comments: Many organizationally closed unities formed with many 
corresponding agreements reached in RAM2. The activity 
remained in the paradoxical loop after some oscillation 
with the logical loop. Small organizationally closed 




Description world: 0ý1 Y2 ý3 v455 1,6 97 58ý9 AB, C D, E F. 
B7 B6 B5 B4 B3 B2 
FLAGI= 011100 (See Figure 5-2) 
Dynamic stability reached: 
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RAM2 contents reached: 
Location 
Universeý, 0123456789ABCDEF 





Comments: Many organizationally closed unities formed with many 
corresponding agreements reached in RAM2. The activity 
remained in the paradoxical loop after some oscillation 
with the logical loop. Small organizationally closed 
unities (e. g. 0-9-8-0; 2-B-5-F-2) are part of larger 
ones (e. g. 0-5-B-7-9-8-0; 9-2-F-5-B-7-9). Others 
overlap like 2-B-5-F-2 and 0-5-B-7-9-8-0. Branches 
like 0-I-E and 5-D-6 may lead to further developments. 
The nervous system 
The enormous potential of even a primitive nervous system 
arises from the nature of its components: the neuron cells. 
These are autopoietic unities that define (distinguish) themselves 
in the physical world (space and time). They are also, individ- 
ually or in groups, universes or independent processors that can 
support descriptions (patterns of nerve impulses) changed by pro- 
cesses that are fired by these same descriptions. 
From a paradoxical perspective they interact paradoxically 
without information transfer forming paradoxical loops in which 
descriptions are endlessly changed into others by closed chains of 
processes (organizationally closed unities) fired by these same 
descriptions. 
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From a logical perspective, the neuron cells or groups of 
them are a priori independent processors that lose their indepen- 
dence when they interact logically through local synchronization 
and information transfer. They form logical loops that may 
include the environment of the unity that beholds the nervous 
system. In these loops, the descriptions that do not fire a 
process are changed into themselves, thereby creating and 
expanding a logical reality (time and space), i. e. a physical 
world "out there" where neuron cells, as autopoietic unities, 
may define, distinguish themselves and form a nervous system in 
which the interaction between paradoxical and logical loops may 
create a logical reality (time and space), i. e. a physical 
world, and so on and on. 
The complex activity generated by only four independent uni- 
verses (each one may also represent a population of neuron cells) 
as shown in the above experiments, points dramatically towards 
the potential of a nervous system of even a moderate complexity. 
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CONCLUDING REMARKS 
The paradoxical nature of organizational closure provides an 
excellent point of departure for further exploration of the 
interplay between the logical and the paradoxical perspectives in 
the living organism and beyond. 
We have seen how the (paradoxical) "drive" for exploration in 
living organisms, that forms part of their definition as paradoxi- 
cal organizations, can generate new organizations that may be also 
paradoxical and explore their own niche (or environment) in this 
same fashion. However, the activity and even the survival of the 
larger unity require a logical behavior (e. g. logical interac- 
tions) of the component living organisms. These latter will 
relinquish their autonomy and pursue the goals of the larger 
unity even if these goals collide with their own goals or with 
those of their kin, especially if they are not components of this 
larger unity. Therefore, any logical association of unities 
(e. g. human beings) carries a seed of danger for the associated 
and the non-associated unities (e. g. other human beings). Living 
organisms or similar unities of only moderate complexity will 
endure the drawbacks implied in this statement without hope for 
counteraction. Human beings, on the other hand, are autonomous 
unities of great complexity capable of transcending creatively, 
through paradoxical behavior, the bonds of any association. It 
is only through this exploration out of the larger unity, of 
whaterver sort, that human beings can express themselves and hope 
to reach their fellow human beings. Moreover, this paradoxical 
exploration out of the comfortable larger unity should be a 
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recurrent exercise of the creative Dowers of the human creature, 
too often deprived of this opportunity by the crippling forces 
(e. g. traditional "education", cultural legacies and so on) that 
protect the goals of the larger unity. These considerations 
stand by themselves as a basis for a world-wide approach to human 
coexistence. 
The biological evolution of homo sapiens since its appearance 
on the planet has been so slow that it has been barely, if at 
all, noticed. However, the larger unities that homo sapiens has 
integrated (social groups) have evolved culturally at an accel- 
erated pace. Acquired characters are inherited in culture, being 
transmitted directly from generation to generation verbally and 
graphically.. But these characters belong to the larger unities 
and not to the component human beings, who must adapt to them, 
or break the bonds. 
Cultural evolution defines the goals of the larger unities 
and shapes social knowledge. Often these goals do not coincide 
with those of the individual. Similarly, social knowledge 
cripples individual knowledge, which is precisely the motor of 
the cultural (social) evolution. With the even more acceler- 
ated pace of "modern times, " the prospects leave little room 
for 
optimism. Nevertheless ... 
One of the oldest goals among larger unities 
(different 
nations, different cultures, etc. ) has been a common 
logical 
language for their component unities (human beings). However, 
this search for a common logical language, e. g. through 
logic 
and mathematics, is a goal for the larger unities and 
it cannot 
be more nonsensical from the point of view of the individual 
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human being, which is a paradoxical, therefore illogical, living 
organism. Consequently, paradoxical interactions are essential 
for this living organism if it is to survive the pressures of the 
larger unities. 
Art and love, in all their forms, stimulate paradoxical 
interactions that are timeless and spaceless for the interacting 
unities and quite impossible from a logical perspective. 
Human beings that persist in logical interactions, imposed on 
them or self-imposed, will become, more sooner than later, incap- 
able of paradoxical interactions (e. g. through artistic expres- 
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APPENDIX 
Realization of the set of microcomputers 
An Intel 8748 microcomputer is the core of each universe 
(Figure A. 1). Two 8185 1K bytes RAMs are the available external 
(to the 8748 itself) RAM for each unit. 1K bytes of RAM is used 
as the "permanent" RAMI and the other 1K bytes, as RAM2 (see 
Figures 5.1 and A. 1). 
8-bit tri-state bidirectional buffers (74LS245) are used to 
reroute (steer) the busses ADB and CB. 
Another bus, ARB (Access Request Bus) is used to request 
mastership of ADB and CB and to access the RAM2s. The access to 
the busses and the access to RAM2 and the associated logic have 
been designed so that only single accesses are possible. 
A closed chain of 74LS373 (8-bit latches) is used as the 
unique location PIB for concurrent accesses and paradoxical inter- 
actions (see Figures 5.1 and A. 1). 
The peripherals, that are not essential to the workings of the 
set of microcomputers, provide a convenient way to load the soft- 
ware and to allow the external observer to observe and to 
interact, 
if so desired. They include a USART 
(Universal Synchronous 
Asynchronous Receiver Transmittter) for serial interface to a ter- 
minal, a Baud Rate Generator 
(several Baud rates), an EPROM 
(Erasable Programmable Read Only Memory) to store, locally, the 
current program, a Random Number Generator 
(RNG) (realized in 
hardware), and the appropriate circuitry to interface with 
ADB, CB 
and ARB (see Figure A-2). 
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Diagrams 
Figure A. 1 is the circuit diagram of a microcomputer unit. 
There are 4 of these units in the set. 
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Experimental set-up revisited 
The paradoxical loop (see Figure 5.2) represents the paradoxi- 
cal perspective since after an organizationally closed unity 
distinguishes itself among the universes (independent microcom- 
puters) (because a chain of processes closes upon itself), the 
activity will remain in this loop as an endless series of descrip- 
tions changed over and over by the processes they themselves fire. 
Different organizationally closed unities may distinguish 
themselves and interact paradoxically in PIB (see Figure 5-1) 
constantly (and recursively) changing the descriptions that they 
themselves generate. As long as the descriptions in PIB fire a 
process in some universe, the paradoxical perspective is not aban- 
doned. 
Moreover,, from this paradoxical perspective two or more pro- 
cessors can read or write concurrently different descriptions from 
or into PIB without conflict, i. e. different events may occur at 
the same time and place as long as they occur in different con- 
current processors (universes). 
The logical loop represents the logical perspective since here 
the storage medium (space and time) is generated and expanded with 
the descriptions that do not fire a process. 
Even the processors 
themselves that support the organizationally closed unities are 
generated and expanded here with the 
descriptions that gradually 
fill the "look-up table" that defines a processor 
from a logical 
perspective. 
The shared RAM2 represents the storage medium 
or environment 
where the different organizationally closed 
unities construct 
their common logical realities. Remember 
that this logical 
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reality (contents of RAM2) is affected only when a description 
fails to fire a process in some universe, i. e. when the paradoxi- 
cal perspective is abandoned to enter the logical perspective. 
As long as there are no descriptions that fire a process in some 
universe, the logical perspective is not abandoned. 
Moreover, from this logical perspective two or more different 
descriptions can be written into or read from the same location in 
RAM if and only if it happens at different times. Two or more 
different descriptions can be written into or read from RAM at the 
same time if and only if it happens at different locations. 
These considerations sound familiar since they apply also to 
our logical realities, to our environment (or should we say to the 
environment of our nervous system? ). It is interesting to con- 
template at this stage the possibility of attaching transducers to 
our microcomputers that will translate the descriptions (computer 
words) that "remain" in RAM2 into aspects of the physical world 
(our environment). Other transducers could sense these aspects of 
the physical world, produced by these same or other microcomputers 
or nervous systems, and translate them into descriptions (computer 
words) to be presented to the microcomputers. These will change 
or maintain the descriptions (aspects of the physical world) until 
some (dynamic and/or "static") stability is reached for all the 
microcomputers or nervous systems concerned. Notice that 
from the 
point of view of the paradoxical loop (perspective) whether 
the 
descriptions in RAM2 are translated into aspects of the 
"physical 
world" or not, is immaterial. 
* 
* 
"ooo an external environment is not a necessary prerequisite of 
the computation of a reality. " (H. von Foerster, 
1976). 
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Notice the interplay between the two loops: from the point 
of view of the paradoxical loop, it provides the descriptions 
that create and expand the storage medium (the logical reali- 
ties). From the point of view of the logical loop, it provides 
the descriptions that fill the look-up table that defines the 
processes that form the organizationally closed unities (the 
paradoxical realities) . 
The activity in these two loops leads to two kinds of sta- 
bility: one, dynamic, represented by the organizationally closed 
unities formed, and the other, "static, " represented by the 
descriptions that "remain" in RAM2, and are common to some or 
all the universes. These stabilities are provoked, maintained or 
perturbed by the several recursive loops at play 
in PIB and 
between RAM1 and RAM2 of the same or different universes 
(see 
Figure 5-2). 
